The multihop routing in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through
replaying routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch
various harmful or even devastating attacks against the routing protocols,
including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. The situation
is further aggravated by mobile and harsh network conditions. Traditional
cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware routing protocols
do not effectively address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against
adversaries misdirecting the multihop routing, we have designed and implemented
TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs. Without tight
time synchronization or known geographic information, TARF provides trustworthy
and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against
those harmful attacks developed out of identity deception; the resilience of
TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both simulation and
empirical experiments on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including
mobile and RF-shielding network conditions. Further, we have implemented a
low-overhead TARF module in TinyOS; as demonstrated, this implementation can be
incorporated into existing routing protocols with the least effort. Based on
TARF, we also demonstrated a proof-of-concept mobile target detection
application that functions well against an antidetection mechanism.
Keywords:- Secure Communication Titles, IEEE Project Titles 2012, Mobile Communication Titles, Wire less Communication Titles.
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